(For more, see Sources 1-6).
Stefan Müller (climate stuff) from Germany, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 >, via Wikimedia Commons
Σ64, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 >, via Wikimedia Commons
When we say something is objective, we are saying we have a strong sense of trust in it. We can have more or less trust (something can be more or less objective), it’s not an all or nothing quality.
Science doesn't need to be value free to be trustworthy (Sources: 3, 7).
We sometimes talk about people, procedures, results, or knowledge claims or statements as objective.
In science, we often focus on evaluating the objectivity (trustworthiness) of a knowledge claim or statement.
If we can’t assess a statement directly, we have to look at the evidence that is provided and the process that was used to come to that conclusion. We also need to rely on experts to make these assessments of evidence / processes.
for more on this, see the Thinking Scientifically section of this site.
Finally, it's important to remember that having a strong sense of trust in a particular claim / statement doesn’t mean that it is an ultimate truth; scientific knowledge is tentative but durable.
Sources:
Brigandt, I. (2015). Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories: beyond inductive risk. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(3), 326-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1079004
Douglas, H. (2023). The importance of values for science. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 1-13.
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Elliott, K.C. & McKaughan, D. J. (2014). Nonepistemic values and the multiple goals of science. Philosophy of Science, 81(1), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1086/674345
Intemann, K. (2015). Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5, 217-232.
Longino, H. E. (1996). Cognitive and non-cognitive values in science: rethinking the dichotomy. In L. Hankinson Nelson & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, science and the philosophy of science (pp. 39-58). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Oreskes, N. (2019). Why Trust Science? Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvfjczxx